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Reports of widespread, systemic, and pervasive abuses by immigration au-
thorities have magnified the life and death consequences of anti-immigrant poli-
cies under the Trump Administration. From family separation and zero-tolerance 
border enforcement, to indefinite, large-scale detention in widely varying condi-
tions, the maltreatment and subsequent deaths of immigrants in the custody of the 
federal government has skyrocketed. Public outcry mounts as journalists and 
human rights organizations document the injuries and complaints of the victims, 
including surviving family members. Congressional inquiries and government 
watchdog agency investigations seek to identify the extent of the problem and the 
damage caused. Meanwhile, lawsuits filed on behalf of victims build on this mo-
mentum, asserting both well-settled and experimental constitutional and statutory 
claims attempting to hold the federal government accountable and compensate 
victims. This Article provides an analysis of several instructive cases in this bur-
geoning field of litigation and the legal theories on which they are based and 
considers the potential of this jurisprudential moment to meaningfully expand the 
landscape of viable claims and remedies for immigrant victims and their families. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Trump Administration severely restricted immigration at the United 
States-Mexico border through an unprecedented number of executive actions 
intended to deter migration to the United States, testing the limits of executive 
influence in immigration law and policy.1 In the absence of meaningful Con-
gressional action to curb the Administration’s agenda, the legal community has 
taken to the judiciary. Because so many of the policies caused immediate and 
irreparable harm to large groups of immigrants who hold rights under the Con-
stitution, many challenges have resulted in nationwide injunctions subsequently 
taken up for review by the Supreme Court of the United States, bypassing the 
typical appellate process.2 
 
1  A recent profile of Trump’s top advisor on immigration, Stephen Miller, the chief architect 
and champion of these restrictive measures, reveals that deterrence and punishment of mi-
grants are central goals of this administration’s immigration policy. Jonathan Blitzer, How 
Stephen Miller Manipulates Donald Trump to Further His Immigration Obsession, NEW 
YORKER: PROFILES (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/03/02/how-
stephen-miller-manipulates-donald-trump-to-further-his-immigration-obsession [https://perm 
a.cc/6S4R-5XPX]. 
2  See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2400 (2018) (upholding the Trump admin-
istration’s travel ban); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019) (finding 
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However, one policy in particular has resulted in a large and varied number 
of claims against the federal government in multiple jurisdictions. It involves 
one of the most controversial and cruel policies to date: the Trump Administra-
tion’s “zero-tolerance” border policy and the systematic physical separation of 
families resulting from its enforcement (“family separation” policy).3 These 
policies involved a dramatic departure from previous border enforcement ap-
proaches that allowed for more discretion, ordering the automatic detention of 
all unauthorized immigrants, even those seeking asylum lawfully at a port of 
entry.4 
The intent of the policies was clear: to send a message to other migrants 
planning to cross through the southern border that they were not welcome and 
that if they tried to cross, they would be punished.5 Federal immigration offi-
cials were directed under zero-tolerance to detain children and parents separate-
ly, regardless of their legal claims or circumstances, in many cases resulting in 
long-term (and in some cases, permanent) separation of parent and child, in-
cluding infants.6 In addition, overcrowded and substandard detention conditions 
 
that the Trump administration’s justification for adding a citizenship question to the national 
census insufficient); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 
1891, 1915 (2020) (vacating the Trump administration’s rescission of the Obama administra-
tion-era Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program as “arbitrary and capricious” under 
the Administrative Procedure Act). But see, e.g., Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. v. New York, No. 
18-558, 589 U.S. ___, 2–3 (2020) (on app. for stay) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (expressing 
frustration and concern regarding the proliferation of trial courts issuing nationwide injunc-
tions challenging Trump’s immigration policies). Much scholarship has yet to be written 
about what these cases might eventually reveal about claims of a unitary executive and other 
separation of powers questions. 
3  See infra Parts II, III. 
4  There are now several layers of restrictive policies that are being carried out at the border, 
including metering, the Migrant Protection Protocol (MPP), Remain in Mexico and more. 
For a detailed accounting, see Polices Affecting Asylum Seekers at the Border: The Migrant 
Protection Protocols, Prompt Asylum Claim Review, Humanitarian Asylum Review Process, 
Metering, Asylum Transit Ban, and How They Interact, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Jan. 29, 
2020), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/policies-affecting-asylum-see 
kers-border [https://perma.cc/U6DH-C7CZ]. Because of these policies, fewer and fewer mi-
grants make it through the Southern Border. See id. Those that do, are still routinely de-
tained. See id. 
5  The President himself made several public statements indicating that the purpose of the 
policy was deterrence and casting migrants as undesirable. For a detailed accounting of the 
creation and implementation of the family separation policy and its impact, see MAJORITY 
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., REP. ON THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION’S FAMILY SEPARATION POLICY: TRAUMA, DESTRUCTION, AND CHAOS 2 
(2020) (documenting evidence indicating that family separation at the border began in Feb-
ruary 2017, just a month into Trump’s presidency, and concluding that the process used to 
separate families was “marked by reckless incompetence and intentional cruelty”); see also 
Carrie F. Cordero et al., The Law Against Family Separation, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
430, 434 (2020). 
6  See Cordero et al., supra note, 5 at 437–40 (offering a detailed accounting of what led to 
the crisis, the government’s actions to implement the policy and an initial survey of some of 
the constitutional and statutory claims raised by the impacted families). 
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have caused severe illness and, in some cases, death.7 Immigration enforcement 
officials relied on family separation not only as a deterrent to future migrants, 
but also as a means to control immigrant families initially detained together.8 
The cruelty was the point. 
The first lawsuits challenging these policies alleged that the government’s 
actions “shocked the conscience” and prioritized the physical reunification of 
families as the remedy for the immediate harm of family separation.9 Rooted in 
the Fifth Amendment Due Process right to family integrity, among other Con-
stitutional and statutory claims, these cases seek not only injunctive relief to 
reunited families and other non-monetary remedies, but in some cases, mone-
tary damages as well.10 An early estimate by legal scholars based on evidence 
of at least four thousand children and parents impacted by family separation 
suggests that “the aggregate liability for the harms suffered could reach up to 
$24 billion.”11 This group of challenges to the specific practice of family sepa-
ration have achieved some preliminary gains at the injunctive relief and class 
certification stages.12 
Although the Trump Administration scaled back some aspects of these pol-
icies, the detained population skyrocketed and record numbers of children and 
adults are dying in immigration custody as a result of neglect and maltreatment 
by immigration officials in public and private detention facilities.13 Intense pub-
 
7  See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-19-51, MANAGEMENT 
ALERT – DHS NEEDS TO ADDRESS DANGEROUS OVERCROWDING AND PROLONGED DETENTION 
OF CHILDREN AND ADULTS IN THE RIO GRANDE VALLEY 2, 12 (2019), https://www.oig.dhs.go 
v/sites/default/files/assets/2019-07/OIG-19-51-Jul19_.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4RH-QFFF]. 
8  For a discursive analysis of the shift at the border from more humanitarian policies regard-
ing families to those centered on deterrence and racialized criminalization of family migra-
tion, see generally Juliet P. Stumpf, Justifying Family Separation, WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021). 
9  See infra Section II.A. 
10  See Cordero et al., supra note 5, at 467–68; see also infra Parts I, II. 
11  See Cordero et al., supra note 5, at 467. 
12  Id. at 461. 
13  See, e.g., Michael Brice-Saddler, The 7-Year-Old Girl Who Died in Border Patrol Custo-
dy Was Healthy Before She Arrived, Father Says, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2018, 3:35 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/12/15/year-old-girl-who-died-border-patrol-c 
ustody-was-healthy-before-she-arrived-father-says/ [https://perma.cc/P8J2-XFNY]; Miriam 
Jordan, ‘A Breaking Point’: Second Child’s Death Prompts New Procedures for Border 
Agency, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/us/felipe-alonzo-
gomez-customs-border-patrol.html [https://perma.cc/VSZ3-M5Z5]; Dara Lind, The Death of 
7-Year-Old Jakelin Caal Maquin in Border Patrol Custody Isn’t an Isolated Outrage, VOX 
(Dec. 18, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/12/18/18144434 [https://perma.cc/7 
CKA-LRQ8]; Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Timeline Shows Final Days of Felipe Alonzo 
Gomez, the Migrant Boy Who Died in U.S. Custody, CBS NEWS (Dec. 26, 2018, 12:32 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/timeline-shows-finals-days-of-felipe-alonzo-gomez-the-mig 
rant-boy-who-died-in-u-s-custody/ [https://perma.cc/3UGZ-SFTT]; Nick Valencia & Eric 
Levenson, The Final Days of Felipe Alonzo-Gomez, the 8-Year-Old Migrant Who Died in 
US Custody, CNN (Dec. 26, 2018, 10:28 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/26/us/cbp-
timeline-guatemala-boy-dies/index.html [https://perma.cc/7KU3-JSLP]; Robert Moore et al., 
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lic scrutiny has shone a light on what appears to be grossly negligent misman-
agement by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including the lack of 
appropriate screening, training, and supervision of the individual immigration 
officers tasked with enforcement.14 The administration’s cruel intentions in en-
acting the policies to begin with, combined with grossly negligent management 
and enforcement by government actors reveal a tragic landscape of harm and 
human cost to immigrant families scattered across the country in public and 
private immigration jails. 
As a result, the cases involving family separation have evolved to include 
claims beyond injunctive relief related to detention conditions, including claims 
seeking compensatory and punitive monetary damages against the govern-
ment.15 Some of these claims trigger questions regarding whether and to what 
extent the government is shielded by immunity. As the cases and theories of 
recovery evolve, Plaintiffs continue to experiment with claims that avoid rele-
vant immunity defenses, particularly because the judiciary has so often deferred 
to the executive when immigration matters are at the core of the claim.16 Courts 
in multiple jurisdictions are expressing sympathy with the victims, yet vary in 
terms of the relief they see available, resulting in a patchwork of early victories 
and a bevy of unresolved questions.17 As claims move forward, the cases will 
reveal which pieces of zero-tolerance, family separation, and mandatory deten-
tion violated the Constitution and whether and to what extent immigration offi-
cials enforcing unconstitutional immigration policies can rely on immunity de-
 
Inside the Cell Where a Sick 16-Year-Old Boy Died in Border Patrol Care, PROPUBLICA 
(Dec. 5, 2019 1:30 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-the-cell-where-a-sick-16-
year-old-boy-died-in-border-patrol-care [https://perma.cc/WP5K-KHFN]. 
14  The Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) released a report in early 2017 detailing the 
staffing, training and management problems within the Department of Homeland Security. 
That report is no longer publicly available, but news outlets reported on its contents. See Tal 
Kopan, Report: ICE Deportations Hindered by Internal Disorganization, CNN: POLITICS 
(Apr. 20, 2017, 5:08 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/politics/ice-deportations-inspect 
or-general/index.html [https://perma.cc/8FMF-VRPA] (reporting that the OIG’s report cited 
to deportation officers’ “overwhelming” caseloads and lack of “well-defined policies and 
procedures”). In a subsequent memo, the OIG expressed concerns about relaxing back-
ground requirements for hiring the 15,000 new officers called for by Trump. See OFF. OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-17-98-SR, SPECIAL REPORT: CHALLENGES 
FACING DHS IN ITS ATTEMPT TO HIRE 15,000 BORDER PATROL AGENTS AND IMMIGRATION 
OFFICERS passim (July 27, 2017), https://oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-
98-SR-Jul17.pdf [https://perma.cc/966Y-D8N3]; see also Todd J. Gillman & Caroline Kelly, 
Call for 15,000 More Border Officers Raises Concerns with Homeland Security’s Internal 
Watchdog, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Aug. 1, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/ne 
ws/politics/2017/08/01/call-for-15000-more-border-officers-raises-concerns-with-homeland-
security-s-internal-watchdog/ [https://perma.cc/4VKR-ZJHD] (reporting that members of 
Congress, immigrant advocacy groups and immigration policy experts expressed concern 
over the contents of the report and the relaxation of polygraph and drug screening hiring re-
quirements in order to speed up the process). 
15  See infra Section II.C. 
16  See infra Section II.C. 
17  See infra Parts II, III. 
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fenses. Where such defenses are unavailable, experimental new claims may 
chart a course toward new theories of accountability and expand the ability for 
private individuals to recover for individual harm inflicted by the federal gov-
ernment and its agents. 
This Article contributes to a relatively new field of academic literature ex-
amining the family separation litigation18 and recent claims involving the abuse 
and death of migrants held in immigration detention facilities.19 It is the first of 
such articles to identify two key bridges between the family separation cases 
and detention treatment cases: the “state-created danger” doctrine and the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which have the potential to meaningfully expand 
the landscape of viable claims by immigrant victims against the government at 
a time when the Supreme Court has been increasingly hostile to traditional the-
ories of recovery against immigration enforcement officers.20 
Part I will situate the rights, claims, and remedies involved in these cases in 
the immigration context. Because the claims are numerous and varied, and be-
cause immigration issues often complicate the claims in meaningful ways, this 
part will offer a general overview of the main theories brought to date through 
the lens of immigration enforcement. Part II will update existing literature con-
cerning the family separation litigation, which has rapidly changed and devel-
oped since the initial cases were first filed, creating a moving target for scholars 
 
18  This Article builds on the initial arguments set forth by a trio of scholars who identified 
the main legal arguments challenging the legality of family separation under domestic and 
international law. See generally Cordero et al., supra note 5 (examining various class ac-
tions, constitutional torts and claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act). Because 
this area of the law is developing so quickly, however, there is much to report from the field 
with regarding to the development of these claims and the advancement of others. Infor-
mation contained in this Article is current as of June 2020. This article does not extensively 
discuss the litigation to release children and families on an emergency basis due to COVID-
19 health and safety concerns. That subject warrants its own article as the cases unfold; rele-
vant analysis will be incorporated herein, as appropriate. 
19  It is important to note that the idea of family separation by virtue of immigration en-
forcement and detention is not a new concept. The Trump Administration’s policies were the 
first to explicitly and systematically implement a specific family separation policy as a deter-
rent, but the federal government has been separating families in immigration detention for a 
long time. See Nina Rabin, Unseen Prisoners: Women in Immigration Detention Facilities in 
Arizona, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 695, 737–38 (2009). 
20  See infra Part I. The Supreme Court most recently ruled that individual recovery was not 
possible against a United States border patrol agent who, while on American soil, shot and 
killed a Mexican child who was playing on the Mexican side of the border. See Hernandez v. 
Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 740, 744, 746–47 (2020). In that case, the Court ruled that sovereign 
immunity shielded the claim, which did not fall into any available exception. The extra-
territorial reach of Constitutional rights is another area of increased litigation and interest as 
a result of American immigration policies at the southern border. Professor Fatma Marouf 
recently published an exceptional piece exploring this issue, including an in-depth examina-
tion of the Circuit Court split regarding the application of qualified immunity when immigra-
tion enforcement officers engage in cross-border shootings of migrants. See generally Fatma 
E. Marouf, Extraterritorial Rights in Border Enforcement, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751, 
799–800 (2020). 
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and practitioners alike. Part III will identify the “state-created danger” doctrine 
and the Federal Tort Claims Act as theories common to family separation and 
detention abuses, exploring whether and how these theories may subvert tradi-
tional governmental immunity defenses. Part IV will identify other emerging 
theories of state liability specifically for harms suffered by detained immi-
grants, particularly children and other vulnerable groups, identifying fertile are-
as for future research and further expansion of theories of recovery for other 
classes of protected migrants. 
I. RIGHTS, CLAIMS, & REMEDIES IN FAMILY SEPARATION AND DETENTION 
ABUSE MATTERS TO DATE 
Anchoring the litigation surrounding family separation and detention abus-
es is the undisputed “bedrock principle[]” that the United States Constitution 
“protects everyone within the territory of the United States, regardless of citi-
zenship.”21 However, the rights enshrined in the Constitution are not applied 
equally to unauthorized immigrants.22 As Hiroshi Motomura so aptly con-
cludes, “unauthorized migrants remain at the law’s margins with rights that are 
indirect and oblique.”23 As such, jurisprudence regarding the degree and extent 
to which a right may be extended to an unauthorized person or group is nu-
anced and complex. The government relocated immigrants impacted by zero-
tolerance, family separation, and detention policies, holding them in various 
custodial settings located throughout the country.24 As a result, the lawsuits that 
have followed are geographically diverse, resulting in many opinions from 
multiple federal jurisdictions. Looking at the body of jurisprudence developed 
to date, there are some common themes worth summarizing before delving into 
the specific cases in which they were developed. 
A. Rights 
Certain rights protect unauthorized immigrants under the Constitution. 
Among them are procedural and substantive due process rights (including the 
right to family integrity and habeas corpus protections), access to legal counsel, 
protections against prolonged detention, and the right to equal protection under 
the law.25 These rights are limited as applied to unauthorized immigrants in im-
 
21  Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1161 (S.D. Cal. 2018); 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). 
22  “Congress may make rules as to [immigrants] that would be unacceptable if applied to 
citizens.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003). 
23  Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the 
Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1729 (2010). 
24  Detention by the Numbers, FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, https://www.freedomforimmigran 
ts.org/detention-statistics [https://perma.cc/W32A-5CVR]. 
25  This list is not exhaustive, but is representative of rights relevant to this Article. See, e.g., 
Jacinto-Castanon de Nolasco v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 319 F. Supp. 3d 491, 502 
(D.D.C. 2018) (petitioners impacted by zero-tolerance and family separation will likely suc-
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portant and complicated ways.26 In general, however, these fundamental liberty 
interests are what give rise to the various claims asserted regarding family sepa-
ration and other government abuses of unauthorized families and children in 
detention. 
B. Claims 
Claims asserted by separated families and immigrants mistreated in deten-
tion vary and include as follows: class actions, individual claims, consent de-
cree violations, and constitutional torts.27 Depending on the nature of the claim, 
sovereign immunity is available to the government in some cases, but not in 
others.28 Due to recent, unfavorable precedent pertaining specifically to immi-
grants, claims subject to a defense of immunity are much more difficult to 
win.29 However, scholars and practitioners are exploring several angles to over-
 
ceed on substantive due process claim based on the right to family integrity); Reno v. Flores, 
507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (immigrants are entitled to Fifth Amendment due process rights); 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“[Immigrants] who 
have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings 
conforming to . . . due process of law.”); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397–98 
(2015) (conditions of civil confinement violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments if the 
harm is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective or is excessive); Rios-
Berrios v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 776 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1985) (immigrants 
have a due process right to obtain counsel of their own choosing at their own expense); 
Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1509 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d sub nom. 
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thomburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990) (transfer of detained immi-
grants interferes with attorney-client relationship); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 
(2001) (indefinite detention is a violation of due process). But see, e.g., Jennings v. Rodri-
guez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 851 (2018) (immigrants subject to mandatory detention do not have a 
statutory right to periodic bond hearings); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (Texas 
law denying a public education to the children of unauthorized immigrants lacked a rational 
basis and violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
26  Discussed at length infra passim. 
27  See Merrit Kennedy, ACLU Sues ICE for Allegedly Separating ‘Hundreds’ of Migrant 
Families, NPR: TWO-WAY (Mar. 9, 2018, 4:14 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/03/09/592374637 [https://perma.cc/5VXB-XPC4] (discussing ACLU’s request for 
a class-action status); see also Miriam Jordan, Judge Blocks Trump Administration Plan to 
Detain Migrant Children, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/2 
7/us/migrant-children-flores-court.html [https://perma.cc/TGK2-FWYH] (discussing the 
judge’s rejection of new regulation that would allow detention of parents and children for 
long period of times as this would be in violation of the Flores decree). 
28  For an overview of the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity, see generally Gregory C. 
Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 439 
(2005). As applied to immigration cases involving family separation and detention abuses, 
the doctrine is in flux as these cases present very new factual allegations not previously de-
cided, as discussed infra passim. 
29  In 2017, the Supreme Court significantly restricted the viability of claims against individ-
ual government agents acting under color of federal law. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 
1843, 1857, 1863 (2017) (ruling against an expansion of so-called Bivens actions for de-
tained non-citizens accused of immigration violations); see also Michael L. Wells, Qualified 
Immunity After Ziglar v. Abbasi: The Case for a Categorical Approach, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 
379, 381–82 (2018). 
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come immunity in a number of family separation and detention abuse cases.30 
Before examining the experimental claims, a brief overview of traditional 
claims in the immigration context is helpful to understand the difficulties faced 
in raising them. 
1. Bivens and Section 1983 Claims 
Enforcement of immigration law involves both federal and state law en-
forcement actors. In family separation cases at the border, the vast majority of 
law enforcement officials involved are federal immigration enforcement offic-
ers, either with Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) or Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), though other federal agents may be involved from time to 
time.31 However, the government actors involved beyond the border in the wid-
er immigration detention network is much more complicated. 
Detention facilities vary in terms of actual custody and control of the indi-
vidual and the relationship of the custodian to the federal government. They 
may be federally owned and operated, privately operated but federally staffed, 
or locally operated (e.g., a state prison or a county jail with an inter-
governmental service agreement or a contract with the federal marshal’s service 
to house immigrant detainees).32 Several immigration detention facilities are 
run by for-profit private prison companies contracted by the federal govern-
ment.33 Considering the deep pockets held by private prisons, they are a natural 
target for these types of claims.34 However, recovery from private prisons is 
 
30  See infra Parts II, III. 
31  Family separation can occur outside of the border zone, involving a large number of state 
and local law enforcement agencies. However, it was federal agents in the Department of 
Homeland Security who were empowered to separate families at the southwest border in 
April 2018. Memorandum from Kevin K. McAleenan, Comm’r of U.S. Customs & Border 
Prot., to Kirstjen Nielsen, Sec. of the Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4936850 [https://perma.cc/B6LE-9HCX] (seek-
ing the Secretary’s decision on increasing prosecutions of immigration violations). 
32  See generally EMILY RYO & IAN PEACOCK, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE LANDSCAPE OF 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES (2018), https://www.americanimmigrationc 
ouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_landscape_of_immigration_detention_in_the_unite
d_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZK2-P3RZ] (offering an empirical analysis of immigration 
detention across the United States, including privately operated facilities). 
33  Id. at 10–12. 
34  See HAUWA AHMED, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, HOW PRIVATE PRISONS ARE PROFITING 
UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION (2019), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploa 
ds/2019/08/29100331/DrivingPrivatePrisons-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/X676-4XRC] 
 (“Trump administration policies around enforcement priorities and detention practices have 
led to an increase in the demand for detention space, which has resulted in record-high prof-
its for private detention facilities.”); see also George Zoley & Kamyar Samimi, Profit and 
Unspeakable Loss, in ACLU OF COLO., CASHING IN ON CRUELTY 3, 3 (2019), https://aclu-
co.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ACLU_CO_Cashing_In_On_Cruelty_09-17-19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TEB6-UBW8]. 
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similarly complicated by immunity doctrines.35 In addition, some detained im-
migrant children are housed in facilities run by the federal Department for 
Health and Human Services (HHS) or are held in other “child appropriate set-
tings” run by local governments under contract with HHS.36 Depending on the 
actors involved in the operation of the detention facility, claims can be made 
against both federal and state actors. 
Both Bivens and Section 1983 actions have been asserted in family separa-
tion and detention abuse cases.37 Created by caselaw, a Bivens claim allows an 
individual to pursue a cause of action against federal official(s) for a violation 
of their constitutional rights.38 Created by the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, a 
Section 1983 claim allows for recovery for both constitutional violations and 
other federal statutory violations against state and local government officials 
and agencies.39 Qualified immunity may be raised as a government defense to 
both causes of action40 and specifically may be asserted in a Section 1983 ac-
tion if the right violated was not “clearly established” under federal law at the 
time of the alleged violation.41 This is particularly troublesome for claims as-
serted by unauthorized migrants whose rights are already compromised as a re-
sult of their non-citizen status. 
 One of the first cases to assert a Bivens claim to challenge immigration en-
forcement practices is the case of Mexican national Laura S., a mother of three 
and a survivor of domestic abuse at the hands of her ex-husband (a suspected 
 
35  See Robin Miller, Rights of Prisoners in Private Prisons, 119 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2004) (detail-
ing the patchwork of claims permitted or denied against private prisons operating under con-
tract with the federal government); see also Doe v. United States, 831 F.3d 309, 317 (5th 
Cir. 2016) (disallowing a § 1983 action against a private detention facility housing detained 
immigrants under contract with the county because the defendants “were performing a feder-
al function,” and the “[c]ounty had almost no involvement in the detention center’s day-to-
day operations”). 
36  See Julie M. Linton et al., Detention of Immigrant Children, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS, Apr. 
2017, at 1, 2 (describing the various custodial settings for immigrant children, both accom-
panied and unaccompanied and detailing the various psychological harms suffered by chil-
dren in these settings). 
37  See infra Section II.B. 
38  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 
(1971) (holding that the Fourth Amendment allows claims against federal agents acting un-
der color of federal authority). 
39  42 U.S.C. § 1983. (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . . .”). For the history of the statute and circuit split concerning state-
created danger theories through 2001, see generally David Pruessner, The Forgotten Foun-
dation of State-Created Danger Claims, 20 REV. LITIG. 357 (2001). 
40  Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (“[W]e deem it untenable to draw a distinc-
tion for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 
and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials.”). 
41  Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 16 (2014) (per curiam). 
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member of a drug cartel) who threatened to kill her if she returned to Mexico.42 
A routine traffic infraction in 2009, led local police to bring Laura, who was 
unauthorized, to the attention of immigration authorities where she was de-
tained and allegedly coerced into signing papers volunteering to leave the coun-
try.43 She pled her asylum claim with immigration authorities who ignored her 
legally supportable articulation of a credible fear of persecution upon return 
and removed her from the country.44 A few days later, Laura was murdered by 
her ex-husband, just as she had feared.45 
 In 2013, Laura’s sister, Maria S., filed suit on behalf of Laura’s children 
against the government of the United States and the individual immigration of-
ficer who made the decision to deport her, allegedly coercing her into signing 
voluntary departure papers.46 In denying the Bivens claims, the District Court 
nevertheless took the unusual step of taking particular note of the extremely 
distressing nature of the facts involved and the lack of a just remedy for the 
family.47 The case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the lower 
court’s award of qualified immunity to the defendants with much less sympa-
thy.48 
Undeterred, Plaintiffs in the Maria S. case filed a petition for certiorari be-
fore the United States Supreme Court.49 The Government’s brief in opposition 
to the petition expressed a concern that allowing the claim for a Bivens action 
could have far-reaching impact for immigration enforcement, precisely because 
it would bring the Constitution to bear on the role that immigration officers 
have in effectuating or infringing procedural due process in the immigration 
 
42  Sarah Stillman, When Deportation Is a Death Sentence, NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-death-sentence 
[https://perma.cc/8CW8-FTR4]. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. The claim was legally supportable for a number of reasons, including that Laura’s ex-
husband had made specific threats of mortal harm against her in the past, was likely to make 
them in the future, was believed to be a member of a drug cartel, and had committed prior 
acts of severe domestic violence against her. Id. With those facts, Laura was very likely to 
survive an initial credible fear determination (had the immigration officials permitted one) 
and also likely to assert a viable claim for asylum before an Immigration Court on the 
grounds of political opinion and a social group claim. Id. 
45  Id. 
46  Maria S. ex rel. E.H.F. v. Doe, 267 F. Supp. 3d 923, 927–29, 931 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
47  Id. at 925–26, 954. The Court noted that the case, “presents one of the most lamentable set 
of circumstances that this Court has ever been called upon to address,” that Laura was, “by 
all accounts otherwise law abiding and was providing for her family to the best of her abil-
ity,” but that nevertheless, Laura was the only fact witness that could provide definitive evi-
dence that her departure was not voluntary and that her selection of that option on the form 
the officers gave her was coerced—and she was dead. Id. 
48  Maria S. ex rel. E.H.F. v. Garza, 912 F.3d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 2019). 
49  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Maria S. ex rel. E.H.F. v. Garza, 140 S. Ct. 81 (2019) 
(Mem.) (No. 18-1350), 2019 WL 1916150. 
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scheme.50 Due to the wide discretion afforded to immigration officials by stat-
ute, they have the power, the incentive, and the mandate to incentivize immi-
grants to waive their rights; specifically, in Maria S., the officers encouraged 
Laura to pursue immigration status and instead self-deport through the volun-
tary departure process, rather than pursue her asylum claim.51 
Unfortunately, in October 2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
Maria S.52 Although the trajectory of the litigation has a disappointing ending, 
as one of the earliest cases to tackle the subject in a hostile jurisdiction to such 
claims, it gained more traction than one might have predicted. For reasons out-
lined herein, the theories developing in the family separation and detention 
conditions cases may result in much better outcomes.53 
2. Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 
The FTCA is a federal statute that was passed by Congress to articulate the 
circumstances in which private citizens may obtain compensation from the 
United States for the torts of federal officials.54 It waives sovereign immunity, 
the doctrine preventing private citizens from recovering against the government 
in court absent the government’s consent, when government agents commit tor-
tious acts or engage in some deliberately malicious acts.55 Individual govern-
ment agents cannot be held personally liable for acts committed within the 
scope of their employment under the FTCA.56 Notably, however, Immigration 
Customs and Border Patrol officers qualify as “law enforcement officers” for 
the provision of the FTCA that “renders the United States liable for certain in-
tentional tort claims” committed by law enforcement officers.57 Typically, these 
types of claims are brought in order to obtain compensatory monetary relief 
(punitive damages are not permitted).58 Importantly, the harm must have oc-
 
50  Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 16, Garza, 140 S. Ct. 81 (2019) (Mem.) (No. 
18-1350), 2019 WL 3425339, at *16. 
51  Id. at 16–17; see also Immigr. Pol’y Ctr., Authority of U.S. Customs and Border Protec-
tion Agents: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Feb. 2012), https://www.americanimmigr 
ationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/CBP_Overview_022112.pdf [https://perma.cc/48 
6Q-AWRZ] (outlining the statutory authority for various search, interrogation and arrest 
powers of CBP). 
52  Maria S. ex rel. E.H.F. v. Garza, 140 S. Ct. 81 (2019) (Mem.). 
53  See infra Section I.C. 
54  The Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, § 401, 60. Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.); 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 
55  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.; 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.1–14.11. 
56  For a recent legal overview of the Federal Tort Claims Act, see KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., R45732, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (FTCA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW 7 
(2019). 
57  Id. at 26. 
58  Id. at 32. 
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curred on American soil in order for the FTCA to apply.59 As will be discussed 
herein, these claims are some of the most promising, yielding early victories in 
attempts to make families whole.60 
3. Other Claims 
A number of other claims fall outside of traditional immunity defenses and 
may chart additional pathways to recovery for victims and their families. As 
will be discussed in further detail infra Parts II–IV, additional legal theories are 
gaining traction in federal courts all over the country, including claims crafted 
under the 14th Amendment due process state-created harm doctrine, the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973,61 the Americans with Disabilities Act,62 and the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.63 Each have been asserted as possible grounds for re-
covery with some success. Notably, some claimants are taking to state courts to 
challenge certain consequences of family separation under state constitutional 
law, particularly in the child welfare context.64 As litigants continue to experi-
ment with novel approaches, new avenues for recovery take shape. 
C. Remedies 
Remedies demanded by mistreated detainees and separated families to date 
include a variety of both monetary and non-monetary compensation for the 
damages alleged, as well as both declaratory and injunctive relief. Importantly, 
the Administrative Procedure Act, which protects against unlawful action by 
immigration authorities in certain contexts, provides a waiver to sovereign im-
 
59  See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title 
shall not apply to . . . [a]ny claim arising in a foreign country.”). 
60  See infra Section II.C. 
61  Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 701 et seq.). 
62  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq.); see also Complaint at 2, Thiersaint v. Dep’t. of 
Homeland Sec., 18-CV-12406 (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 2018). 
63  Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (current version at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 701 et seq.). 
64  Like family separation cases at the border, these cases are rooted in the Constitutional 
right to family integrity. Typically, the involvement of the federal government is different in 
these cases, where children are separated from their parents as a result of an order of depor-
tation or through the family justice system in state courts, rather than by actual physical sep-
aration of a federal immigration official while in the custody of the federal immigration au-
thorities at the border. See, e.g., Dep’t. of Child Safety v. Juan P., 427 P.3d 785, 786 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2018) (discussing the case of a Mexican father separated from his U.S. citizen son 
via deportation and again via the child welfare system). These cases are nonetheless instruc-
tive, particularly with regard to family separation cases under Trump’s policies that involve 
forced un-accompaniment and post-separation placement of children into foster care by the 
federal and state government. See infra Section II.D. 
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munity in cases where money damages are not pursued.65 When all of the cases 
filed to date are viewed together, three general categories of remedies emerge: 
(1) those restoring the physical liberty or integrity of the person or family unit, 
typically through declaratory or injunctive relief; (2) procedural remedies, in-
cluding the granting of immigration benefits, de novo review of the denial of 
benefits and/or the removal or waiver of certain barriers to immigrant status; 
and (3) government oversight and accountability measures.66 
1. Physical Liberty and Integrity 
Declaratory or injunctive relief seeking the release of classes of immigrants 
from detention and family reunification are rooted mainly in Constitutional 
rights involving due process, habeas corpus, and equal protection.67 Although 
often obtained relatively quickly, these remedies are incomplete in healing the 
universe of physical and psychological damage done by family separation. Be-
yond reunification, the most recent development in remedial action involves 
court-ordered psychological services for impacted children and families, 
whether detained or released.68 Additionally, recent reports of forced labor and 
other abuses within private immigration detention facilities and the resulting 
deaths seek to lay a foundation for claims to compensate the surviving rela-
tives.69 
Monetary damages in family separation and detention cases may be possi-
ble in addition to injunctive relief. The challenge, however, is that including a 
request for monetary damages will likely trigger a sovereign immunity de-
 
65  Challenges pursuant to the APA cannot be brought in federal district court to second-
guess a removal determination by an immigration judge. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). However, 
many other successful immigration challenges have been grounded in the APA. See, e.g., 
Soltane v. U.S. Dep’t. of Just., 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing the denial of a 
visa petition based on the improper application of an immigration regulation); Barahona-
Gomez v. Reno, 167 F.3d 1228, 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999) (granting preliminary injunction 
where there was a reasonable question whether directives to immigration judges serving in 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) violated the APA). 
66  A separate issue is the availability for attorney fees and costs under the Equal Access to 
Justice Act, which incentivizes attorneys to represent unauthorized immigrants in federal 
court pro bono to assert their rights. The remedy does not necessarily flow directly to the 
individual and is only awarded at the conclusion of the litigation in a separately contested 
matter, but its availability does increase the likelihood of representation for unauthorized 
immigrants with colorable claims for relief. Notably, EAJA does not allow recovery of at-
torneys’ fees and costs in Bivens claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d); 5 U.S.C. § 504 et seq.; see 
Trina Realmuto & Stacy Tolchin, Practice Advisory: Requesting Attorneys’ Fees Under the 
Equal Access to Justice Act, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (June 17, 2014), https://www.nationalim 
migrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_advisories/fed/2014_17Jun_eaja.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/MG7B-UZ43]. 
67  See Cordero et al., supra note 5, at 462 (discussing in detail the use of these reliefs based 
on violations of Constitutional rights). 
68  Miriam Jordan, U.S. Must Provide Mental Health Services to Families Separated at Bor-
der, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019), http://nyti.ms/2Cn1luy [https://perma.cc/9TYE-TRMB]. 
69  See infra Part IV. 
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fense.70 In a case where reunifying the family is the primary concern, it may be 
strategically wise to prioritize injunctive relief over monetary damages in the 
short term. 
In June 2019, the first case to prevail in seeking monetary damages against 
CBP and ICE under the FTCA resulted in a payment of $125,000 to a mother 
and son mistreated by government officials while imprisoned in a family deten-
tion center under the Obama administration.71 Their FTCA claim included alle-
gations that the deportation officers threatened to separate them.72 Although the 
case was ultimately settled out of court, it survived a government challenge to 
transfer venue from New Jersey to Texas.73 The government’s choice to settle 
the case may signal at least some concern about the likelihood of the family’s 
potential success on the merits and a desire to avoid the risk of unfavorable 
precedent. For reasons discussed infra, FTCA claims under Trump’s zero-
tolerance and family separation policies may be even stronger and may result in 
even larger recoveries.74 
2. Procedural Remedies 
In some family separation cases and detention determinations, the govern-
ment did not follow its own procedures. For example, asylum-seekers are enti-
tled to an initial determination regarding whether the facts and circumstances 
giving rise to their migration have the potential to form the basis of a claim for 
asylum.75 Known as “credible fear interviews,” this procedural step was often 
 
70  For example, the Administrative Procedure Act waives sovereign immunity for claims 
against the government when the plaintiff is seeking relief other than monetary damages. 5 
U.S.C. § 702. Therefore, it may make sense to bring a declaratory or injunctive action, rather 
than seeking monetary damages, to avoid triggering the sovereign immunity defense. 
71  Consent Order Approving Settlement and Dismissal of Action, Alvarado v. United States, 
16-CV-05028 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2019), ECF 97; see Sarah Stillman, How Families Separated 
at the Border Could Make the Government Pay, NEW YORKER (June 15, 2019), https://www. 
newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-families-separated-at-the-border-could-make-the-gove 
rnment-pay [https://perma.cc/BYU8-ZKWX]; William Montgomery, Victory for Asylum 
Seekers Suing ICE & CBP, ASYLUM SEEKER ADVOC. PROJECT (June 17, 2019), 
https://asylumadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Release-Victory-for-Asylum-Seeke 
rs-Suing-ICE-and-CBP.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YDH-CCCA]. 
72  Montgomery, supra note 71. 
73  Alvarado v. United States, No. 16-5028, 2017 WL 2303758, at *8 (D.N.J. 2017). The 
government’s push to transfer the case to Texas was likely an attempt at forum shopping pri-
or to a decision on the merits of a motion to dismiss the substantive claims. In general, the 
Fifth Circuit is less sympathetic to the claims of immigrants than the Third Circuit. See supra 
notes 46–52 and accompanying text. 
74  See infra Section II.C. 
75  Passing a Credible/Reasonable Fear Interview, IMMIGR. EQUAL. (June 3, 2020), 
https://immigrationequality.org/legal/legal-help/asylum/eligibility/passing-a-credible-reason 
able-fear-interview/ [https://perma.cc/EY6T-3XBZ]. 
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delayed or overlooked during the height of the crisis.76 Requesting a court to 
instruct the government to afford the litigant the opportunity to be heard in a 
credible fear interview is a procedural remedy that may ultimately result in re-
lease from detention, since individuals who receive positive credible fear inter-
views are entitled to a bond or parole hearing.77 
Other humanitarian migration crises have resulted in the creation by litiga-
tion of an entirely new form of immigration relief as a form of procedural rem-
edy.78 In other cases involving sympathetic humanitarian elements (e.g., human 
trafficking or other cases where the immigrant is a material witness or victim of 
a crime), the government may agree to afford the litigant prosecutorial discre-
tion (also known as “deferred action”), parole-in-place, or humanitarian parole 
in an effort to allow an individual to stay in the United States who would oth-
erwise be ineligible for any other form of immigration relief.79 In cases where 
humanitarian conditions have worsened or new facts give rise to new threats, 
the immigrant may request and/or the government may agree to a de novo re-
view of the initial determination of the immigration judge who entered the final 
deportation order.80 
It is not unprecedented for the such procedural remedies to be included in 
the forms of non-monetary relief requested.81 However, many of the individuals 
impacted by family separation may not have a form of immigration relief im-
mediately available to them. For those who were abused or who were victims 
of crimes committed by government agents in detention facilities, these types 
of remedies allow impacted individuals the right to stay in the United States 
 
76  See Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human Rights Law to 
Realign Immigration Detention in the United States, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 243, 304, 309 
(2013). 
77  Id. at 317–18. 
78  See, e.g., Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 1991) 
(representing “ABC litigation” for Guatemalan and Salvadoran asylum seekers and the sub-
sequent passage of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act); see also 
Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Validity, Construction, and Application of Nicaraguan Adjustment 
and Central American Relief Act, 191 A.L.R. Fed. 343 (2004). 
79  For a critique of these types of “immigration nonstatus” and their proliferation since 1990, 
see Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1119–20 (2015). 
80  Immigr. Pol’y Ctr., Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, AM. 
IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Sept. 2011), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/fi 
les/research/IPC_Prosecutorial_Discretion_090911_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/XLA5-
UWW6]. 
81  See infra Part III (discussing mental health services as a remedy for the children separated 
from their family); see also Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 
1149 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (granting a classwide preliminary injunction in favor of the Plaintiffs, 
ordering ICE to not detain the class members without their children); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 
727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 42 n.11 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[T]he FTCA itself does not purport to forbid in-
junctive relief, as it merely states that it is [just] ‘exclusive of any other civil action or pro-
ceeding for money damages.’ ”). 
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temporarily, avoid deportation post-release, and (most importantly) may open 
up an avenue for permanent status.82 
3. Government Oversight and Accountability Measures 
Minimum standards for the detention of children have been in place since 
1997, through a judicially-created instrument known as the Flores consent de-
cree.83 It empowers the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California to hear complaints concerning the government’s failure to maintain 
these standards.84 As will be discussed infra, Flores has been invoked in family 
separation litigation and in case challenging detention conditions for minors in 
custody as a result of zero-tolerance.85 This is an example of a strategy known 
as “public law litigation” where the claims involve matters of great public in-
terest rooted in constitutional claims rather than those that provide specific 
remedies to private individuals to compensate them for harms suffered (such as 
the FTCA and Bivens actions).86 
Additionally, advocates and movement lawyers may choose to file cases 
that are likely to survive a motion to dismiss but are unlikely to succeed on the 
merits due to an unlucky bench draw or a lack of strong precedent simply to 
bring attention to the issue, engage in discovery, or force a settlement.87 Alt-
hough unlikely to result in specific relief to any individual or class, the case 
may serve an important function in forcing the government to reveal critical in-
formation through the discovery process that may later serve as the factual 
predicate for claims more likely to succeed in the future. Information and gov-
ernment accountability in and of itself can serve as a remedy, if not for the liti-
gants, for future similarly situated victims. This type of remedy is common in 
 
82  It is important to note that without a path to lawful permanent residency and naturaliza-
tion, such forms of relief are subject to the whim of the executive because they primarily 
take the form of prosecutorial discretion, or, a promise from the executive to refrain from 
active deportation, which means that the individual is eligible for few, if any, actual benefits 
beyond work authorization. 
83  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993); Stipulated Settlement Agreement at 7, Flores v. 
Reno, No. 85-4544 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997); Flores v. Sessions, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1041, 
1062–63 (C.D. Cal. 2017). 
84  Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 83, at 14–15, 20. 
85  See infra Part IV. 
86  Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1284 (1976) (“Perhaps the dominating characteristic of modern federal litigation is that law-
suits do not arise out of disputes between private parties about private rights. Instead, the 
object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies. . . . Most im-
portant, the trial judge has increasingly become the creator and manager of complex forms of 
ongoing relief, which have widespread effects on persons not before the court and require 
the judge’s continuing involvement in administration and implementation.”). 
87  Recent Supreme Court cases have somewhat limited the effectiveness of this approach, 
particularly in employment discrimination cases, but it is still fairly regularly employed for 
civil rights cases in the public interest. See William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibil-
ity Pleading, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 693, 696, 713, 735, 737 (2016). 
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cases that reach international tribunals, which family separation and detention 
abuse case very well may.88 
II. FAMILY SEPARATION 
The Trump Administration’s family separation policy was implemented 
quietly and remained largely unpublicized for months.89 DHS was able to es-
cape large-scale public scrutiny until the news outlet ProPublica released an 
audio tape revealing the cries of separated immigrant children calling out for 
their parents.90 Following the groundbreaking reporting of several additional 
news outlets on the appalling conditions of the mass incarceration of children 
separated from their parents by DHS, public pressure and government obfusca-
tion ensued.91 Separation of families at the border continued well beyond the 
 
88  One of the most successful cases to achieve such a remedy to date against the United 
States government is the case of Jessica Lenahan, a Latinx woman whose children were 
murdered due to the failure of the law enforcement officers in the state of Colorado to en-
force an order of protection intended to protect her and her children from their violently abu-
sive father. See Sarah Rogerson, Domesticating Due Diligence: Municipal Tort Litigation’s 
Potential to Address Failed Enforcement of Orders of Protection, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 289, 290–92 (2012) (detailing the original claim, the trajectory of the case, and 
the impact of the international litigation). Her prayer for relief was ultimately denied in an 
intellectually dishonest Supreme Court opinion authored by the late Justice Antonin Scalia. 
Id. at 300–01. Because her case was disposed of in the lower courts on a motion to dismiss, 
Jessica never received her “day in court.” Id. at 293. However, Professor Caroline Bettinger-
Lopez, counsel at the Supreme Court, pressed the case further at Jessica’s direction, filing a 
complaint with the Inter-American system, which ultimately invited Jessica to share her 
emotional and compelling testimony. Id. at 331–32. The result was a scathing report detail-
ing the failures of the American justice system to protect domestic violence victims and their 
families, including systemic failures involving a lack of police protection. Id. at 292. The 
entire saga would ultimately result in a project to domesticate the international ruling declar-
ing freedom from domestic violence to be a fundamental human right. Id. at 294. Dozens of 
local resolutions were passed by American municipal governments affirming the ruling and, 
in some cases, charging local police specifically with the duty to enforce orders of protection 
in accordance with international law. See id. at 309–10. Although Jessica never recovered a 
dime from the government, she became an international spokeswoman for domestic violence 
victims in the United States and inspired state and local governments to increase protections 
against domestic violence. See id. at 323–24. 
89  In June 2018, DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen denied the existence of a family separation 
policy, but a memo sent to her office from the then Acting Director of Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement dated April 2018 proved that to be false. For a detailed accounting of the 
resulting revelations, see Cordero et al., supra note 5, at 440–43. 
90  See Ginger Thompson, Listen to Children Who’ve Just Been Separated from Their Par-
ents at the Border, PROPUBLICA (June 18, 2018, 3:51 PM), https://www.propublica.org/articl 
e/children-separated-from-parents-border-patrol-cbp-trump-immigration-policy [https://perm 
a.cc/GR6M-RH38] (releasing audio obtained by a DHS employee). 
91  See, e.g., Aura Bogado et al., Migrant Children Coming to the US Are Being Sent to Shel-
ters with Histories of Child Abuse Allegations, WORLD (June 20, 2018, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-06-20/migrant-children-coming-us-are-being-sent-shelters-
histories-child-abuse [https://perma.cc/EZ93-FRN3]; Molly Hennessy-Fiske, ‘Prison-Like’ 
Migrant Youth Shelter Is Understaffed, Unequipped for Trump’s ‘Zero Tolerance’ Policy, 
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alleged discontinuation of the policies that led to it.92 However, the resulting 
litigation has created a roadmap for future claimants and classes of impacted 
individuals by articulating the rights implicated, the actors responsible, and the 
Constitutional violations that federal immigration officials and agencies com-
mitted in designing, implementing, and enforcing it.  
A. The Right to Family Integrity 
From the beginning of the litigation, the right to family integrity has been 
central, with many judges granting injunctive relief on that basis to reunite fam-
ilies that had been separated.93 The first case to establish a class of separated 
families entitled to relief, Ms. L. v. United States Immigration and Customs En-
forcement, did so fairly quickly.94 The ACLU and others filed the case in Feb-
ruary 2018, long before public attention was focused on the issue.95 The com-
plaint alleged substantive and procedural due process violations under the Fifth 
Amendment right to family integrity and sought class action certification of the 
hundreds of parents separated from their children.96 The Court defined the class 
as follows: 
All adult parents who enter the United States at or between designated ports of 
entry . . . who (1) have been, are, or will be detained in immigration custody by 
the [Department of Homeland Security], and (2) have a minor child who has 
been, is or will be separated from them by DHS and has been, is or will be de-
tained in [Office of Refugee Resettlement] custody, ORR foster care, or DHS 
custody, absent a determination that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to 
the child.97 
 
Insider Says, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-
border-migrant-shelter-20180614-story.html [https://perma.cc/V2G6-3RU6]. 
92  See Stephen Collinson & Lauren Fox, Outrage Grows as Families Are Separated, Will 
Trump Change His Policy?, CNN (June 18, 2018, 8:59 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/ 
18/politics/immigration-trump-congress-family-separation/index.html [https://perma.cc/6TA 
6-V5YF]; Annie Correal, Why Big Law Is Taking on Trump over Immigration, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 21, 2018), http://ntyi.ms/2DBzPLn [https://perma.cc/SZ3K-N2JD]; Maya Rhodan, 
Lawyers on the Border Still Dealing with Fallout from Family Separations, TIME (Aug. 20, 
2018, 2:14 PM), https://time.com/5371963 [https://perma.cc/F444-VPNX]. 
93  See infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
94  Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
at 1–2, Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 
18-0428), ECF No. 1. 
95  Id. at 10. 
96  Id. at 3, 7–8; see also Notice of Motion and Motion for Class Certification, Ms. L. v. U.S. 
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 18-0428), ECF No. 
35. 
97  Ms. L., 310 F. Supp. 3d at n.5 (emphasis added). The italics signify class modification 
granted in a subsequent ruling. Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 330 F.R.D. 284, 
292–93 (S.D. Cal. 2019). 
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The Petitioners did not pursue monetary damages under the FTCA, but fo-
cused on injunctive relief.98 
 The injunctive ruling achieved in Ms. L. scored an early and important win 
for families seeking to hold the government accountable for family separa-
tions.99 The Court found that the Petitioners were likely to succeed on the 
threshold legal question: whether the zero-tolerance policy and the separation 
of families pursuant to it violated the Petitioners Fifth Amendment constitu-
tional right to family integrity.100 The United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized a liberty interest in family relationships and the care, custody and control 
of one’s children, finding that family integrity is an “intrinsic” human right.101 
Courts have judicially extended the right to immigrants, with mixed results.102 
However, thus far the right has been universally recognized in the family sepa-
ration cases filed to date. 
The crux of the survival of the claims in Ms. L. had to do with the distinc-
tion that the Plaintiff was separated from her child as a result of an “unneces-
sary government action intended to separate family units who were arrested to-
gether,” rather than a, “necessary incident of detention.”103 Additionally, Ms. L. 
was the first case to apply a “shocks the conscience” standard involving an ap-
praisal of “the totality of the circumstances” to a claim of family integrity in the 
 
98  The Third Amended Complaint lists three counts: (1) Violation of Due Process: Right to 
Family Integrity; (2) Administrative Procedure Act: Arbitrary and Capricious Practice; and 
(3) Violation of Right to Seek Protection Under the Asylum and Withholding of Removal 
Statutes, and the Convention Against Torture. Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief at 14–16, Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 
1133 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 18-0428), ECF No. 250. 
99  Notably, other cases asserting additional claims for relief were not heard as courts referred 
cases that fit within the Ms. L class certification. See, e.g., M.M.M. ex rel. J.M.A. v. Ses-
sions, 347 F. Supp. 3d 526, 526, 529–30, 535–37 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (alleging due process and 
APA violations, a claim requesting judicial review of the expedited removal policy survived 
but is in settlement); M.M.M. ex rel. J.M.A. v. Sessions, 319 F. Supp. 3d 290, 296 (D.D.C. 
2018); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 55–58, Dora v. Sessions, No. 18-
CV-01938 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2018) (including a Rehabilitation Act claim in addition to due 
process and APA challenges); N.T.C. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 18-CV-6428, 
2018 WL 3472544, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2018) (including an argument under Flores in 
addition to the due process and APA claims). 
100  Ms. L., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 1149. 
101  Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); see al-
so Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in this 
case—the interest of parents in the care, custody and control of their children—is perhaps 
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”); Quilloin v. Wal-
cott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the rela-
tionship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment.” (citations omitted)). 
102  Jason B. Binimow, Application of Due Process Right to Family Integrity and Familial 
Association to Aliens and Immigrants, 32 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 8, at § 4 (2018). 
103  Id. at n.11. 
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immigration detention context to determine whether an individual’s due pro-
cess right was violated.104 We see here that the cruelty of the family separation 
policy itself and the cruelty with which it was implemented is central to the 
holding. This would prove to be a critical foundation for claims that would fol-
low Ms. L., particularly those seeking individual relief through civil rights ac-
tions, because, as discussed later in this Article, the nature of the conduct of the 
government actors as “shocking” or “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t]” is central to 
those claims.105 
The Ms. L. lawsuit has led to the reunification of hundreds of families, and 
just as importantly, has uncovered multiple instances of official mismanage-
ment by federal immigration officials in the tracking, monitoring, and docu-
mentation of families separated under the policy, resulting in further harms to 
an as-yet unknown number of families.106 The Court in Ms. L. characterized the 
degree of mismanagement as a “startling reality” in a strong rebuke and recita-
tion of the government’s failures: 
[T]he practice of separating these families was implemented without any effec-
tive system or procedure for (1) tracking the children after they were separated 
from their parents, (2) enabling communication between the parents and their 
children after separation, and (3) reuniting the parents and children . . . .The 
government readily keeps track of personal property of detainees in criminal and 
immigration proceedings. Money, important documents, and automobiles, to 
name a few, are routinely catalogued, stored, tracked and produced upon a de-
tainees’ release, at all levels . . . .The unfortunate reality is that under the present 
system migrant children are not accounted for with the same efficiency and ac-
curacy as property.107 
The ongoing implementation of the injunction may reveal additional facts 
that shock the conscience and give rise to newly apparent Constitutional claims. 
In the meantime, the precedent set by the initial opinion is already sizeable, 
providing ample foundation for future claims. 
B. Family Separation, Bivens, and § 1983 Civil Rights Claims 
Six days prior to the ruling in Ms. L., a lawsuit was filed in the Northern 
District of Illinois on behalf of two Brazilian children separated from their par-
ents at the border, requesting injunctive relief to consolidate the immigration 
proceedings of each father/son pair, release the boys and their fathers from de-
tention, and reunite the families.108 Interestingly, in granting reunification (not 
release, which the Court found to be outside of the right to family integrity),109 
 
104  Id. § 6. 
105  See infra Sections II.C, IV.C. 
106  Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1144 (S.D. Cal. 2018). 
107  Id. 
108  W.S.R. v. Sessions, 318 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1119, 1122, 1128, 1133 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
109  Id. at 1132. 
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the Judge himself suggested a complementary Bivens claim might be in order in 
its opinion granting the relief requested.110 In a footnote, the Court posits: 
 In light of the alleged policymaking at the highest levels of the federal agen-
cies, another possible exception to sovereign immunity would have been to seek 
injunctive relief by naming the federal supervisory officials in their individual, 
rather than official, capacities. In that situation, a Bivens claim for injunctive re-
lief might be appropriate.111 
This suggestion raises the possibility of pleading a Bivens claim to recover 
monetary damages in addition to injunctive relief. At least one federal judge 
seems open to the idea.112 It seems that Bivens claims may be more successful 
in cases where the families separated allege psychological harm in addition to 
the physical act of family separation, or as discussed infra, additional physical 
and mental harm while in detention.113 
In October 2019, the ACLU filed another family separation case asserting 
two nationwide classes, one of parents and the other of children separated at the 
border, claiming due process violations as well as statutory civil rights claims 
and seeking monetary damages.114 This case is a harbinger for the viability of 
Bivens and statutory civil rights claims moving forward. At this point, it is still 
too early to tell what, if anything, will come of these claims in the family sepa-
ration litigation. Briefing is underway on the government’s motion to dis-
miss.115 However, like Ms. L, the unreasonableness of the government’s con-
duct is central to the claims. As the Complaint alleges, the conduct of the 
government actors named: 
 
110  Id. at 1123. 
111  Id. at 1123 n.3 (citing Bunn v. Conley, 309 F.3d 1002, 1009 (7th Cir. 2002)) (“A Bivens 
claim can be brought as an allegation that a constitutional injury arose out of the actions of 
federal agents—regardless of the nature of the relief sought.” (quoting Conley, 309 F.3d at 
1009)). 
112  Id. 
113  Early attempts have not proven fruitful. In K.O. v. U.S. Immigration and Customs En-
forcement, the Plaintiffs were a putative class of minor, non-citizens who were forcibly sepa-
rated from their parents and classified as “unaccompanied.” See K.O. v. U.S. Immigr. & 
Customs Enf’t, No. 20-309, 2020 WL 3429697, at *2 (D.D.C. June 23, 2020). In addition to 
due process claims, they asserted Bivens and other statutory civil rights claims seeking mon-
etary damages for mental health treatment of the class members. Id. at *6. All claims were 
dismissed. Id. at *8–9. 
114  Class Action Complaint at 1, 63–69, 73–75, A.I.I.L. v. Sessions, No. 19-CV-00481 (D. 
Ariz. Oct. 3, 2019). 
115  Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim, A.I.I.L. 
v. Sessions, No. 19-CV-00481 (D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 2020), ECF No. 28; Stipulation for Exten-
sion of Time, A.I.I.L. v. Sessions, No. 19-CV-00481 (D. Ariz. Mar. 20, 2020), ECF No. 29; 
Order, A.I.I.L. v. Sessions, No. 19-CV-00481 (D. Ariz. Mar. 24, 2020), ECF No. 30 (grant-
ing the parties’ Stipulation for Extension of Time); Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss, A.I.I.L. v. Sessions, No. 19-CV-00481 (D. Ariz. Apr. 22, 2020), ECF 
No. 31; Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, A.I.I.L. v. Sessions, No. 19-CV-00481 (D. 
Ariz. June 2, 2020), ECF No. 32; Notice of Supplemental Authorities, A.I.I.L. v. Sessions, 
No. 19-CV-00481 (D. Ariz. June 24, 2020), ECF No. 33. 
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[S]hocks the conscience, interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty, and demonstrates their deliberate indifference to the violation of Plain-
tiffs’ and Class Members’ constitutional right to due process.116 
This is a direct challenge to immunity defenses, which will require the 
court to wrestle with the Bivens factors as they have been interpreted to apply 
in the immigration context.117 The court will need to determine whether the 
unique abuses and rights violations alleged in Ms. L. are meaningfully different 
from the types of claims courts have or have not recognized in the past.118 If the 
Bivens claims survive a motion to dismiss, this case has the potential to be 
precedent-setting. 
C. Family Separation and FTCA 
Subsequent to the initial cases regarding family separation, the American 
Immigration Council filed a complaint on behalf of multiple families for com-
pensatory damages and attorney’s fees and costs under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence.119 
Building on the right to family integrity established in Ms. L., petitioners in 
C.M. v. United States argue that forced family separation by federal officials in 
immigration detention facilities, absent a showing of parental unfitness or other 
danger to their children, violates a family’s substantive due process rights to 
family integrity under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.120 Similar to other family separation cases, the lawsuit asserts substantive 
and procedural due process claims, but rather than injunctive relief to reunite 
families, Plaintiffs seek monetary compensation for the damages caused by 
family separation under the FTCA.121 
The factual allegations in the C.M. complaint makes explicit the govern-
ment’s intent to separate families through the policy as a deterrent to future mi-
gration and the deeply flawed and intentionally cruel manner with which gov-
ernment agents carried out the policy.122 The complaint proceeds with two 
counts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence.123 
 
116  Class Action Complaint, supra note 114, at 67–71. 
117  Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858–64 (2017) (“[A] case can present a new context 
for Bivens purposes if it implicates a different constitutional right; if judicial precedents pro-
vide a less meaningful guide for official conduct; or if there are potential special factors that 
were not considered in previous Bivens cases.”). 
118  Id. at 1859, 1863. 
119  Complaint at 73–74, C.M. v. United States, No. 19-CV-05217, 2020 WL 1698191 (D. 
Ariz. Sept. 19, 2019). 
120  Id. at 24–25 n.53; see Parents Ripped Apart from Their Children by Family Separation 
Policy File Claims Against Trump Administration, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Feb. 11, 2019), 
http://americanimmigrationcouncil.org/news/parents-ripped-apart-their-children-family-
separation-policy-file-claims-against-trump [https://perma.cc/L6YS-BQU3]. 
121  Complaint, supra note 119, at 73–74. 
122  Complaint, supra note 119, at 1, 3. 
123  Complaint, supra note 119, at 73–74. 
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The case is still pending in the District of Arizona, having survived the 
government’s motion to dismiss asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
on two bases: (1) “Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the due care and discretion-
ary function exceptions to the FTCA;” and (2) “Plaintiffs have failed to allege 
claims for which there is a private person analog or for which a private person 
could be held liable under applicable state law.”124 The main thrust of the gov-
ernment’s arguments was that the family separation policy was a function of 
existing immigration laws, not a lapse of judgment by immigration enforce-
ment agents and that immigration detention is a matter of federal discretion to 
which there is no private actor analog.125 Plaintiffs responded that the excep-
tions do not apply because no immigration statute or regulation mandated fami-
ly separation and further, that virtually any immigration case would fail under 
the government’s broad interpretation of the private actor analog require-
ment.126 The Court agreed with the Plaintiffs, holding that the Plaintiffs suc-
cessfully “demonstrated that ‘a private individual under like circumstances 
would be liable under state law’ for the allegedly tortious conduct committed 
by the United States” and that the government failed to articulate an exception 
to the FTCA waiver of immunity.127 
Importantly, the Plaintiffs dug deeply into the justifications that the gov-
ernment employs to defend against the FTCA claim.128 The government assert-
ed that because zero-tolerance required parents to be detained for the pendency 
of their immigration proceedings and because the Flores agreement prohibits 
the detention of minors in adult facilities, they were forced to separate fami-
lies.129 Plaintiffs responded in four parts: (1) the Flores agreement was intended 
to protect the best interests of children and promote family unification rather 
than family separation; (2) the Flores agreement is not a statute or regulation; 
(3) officers did not separate families pursuant to the Flores agreement because 
the separations occurred within days of arrival, where as the agreement permits 
families to be detained together for twenty days; and (4) the exceptions argued 
by the government only apply when a statute or regulation mandates the actions 
 
124  Motion and Memorandum in Support of the United States of America’s Motion to Dis-
miss at 2, C.M. v. United States., No. 19-CV-05217, 2020 WL 1698191 (D. Ariz. Dec. 23, 
2019) (internal citations omitted); C.M. v. United States, No. 19-CV-05217, 2020 WL 
1698191, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2020) (denying the United States’ Motion to Dismiss). 
125  Motion and Memorandum in Support of the United States of America’s Motion to Dis-
miss, supra note 124, at 13, 19–20. 
126  Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 7–8, 10, 17, C.M. v. United 
States, No. 19-CV-05217, 2020 WL 1698191 (D. Ariz. Feb. 6, 2020). 
127  C.M., 2020 WL 1698191, at *5. 
128  Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 5–6, C.M. v. United States, 
No. 19-CV-05217, 2020 WL 1698191 (D. Ariz. Feb. 6, 2020). 
129  Motion and Memorandum in Support of the United States of America’s Motion to Dis-
miss, supra note 124, at 5–6, 8. 
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at issue.130 Having survived the motion, this particular case is now in discovery 
until June 2021.131 
In addition to C.M., another family separation case that has potential to 
make FTCA precedent is the case of a father and son from Guatemala who 
sought asylum in the United States and were separated by immigration officials 
at the U.S.-Mexico border in June 2018.132 The father was detained and deport-
ed without full consideration of his asylum claim, while his son was placed in 
an ORR facility in the United States where he suffered physical, emotional, and 
sexual abuse at the hands of staff members in the facility.133 They were separat-
ed for nine months before being reunited under the Ms. L. order.134 The suit al-
leges intentional infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA for father and 
son, under a bevy of allegations of cruelty by immigration officials at every 
step of the process, as well as abuse of process, negligence/violation of family 
integrity, and negligence of the child in custody.135 The prayer for relief in-
cludes $6,000,000 in compensatory relief, split evenly between father and 
son.136 The complaint focuses on the intent of the government behind the crea-
tion and implementation of the family separation program.137 As more and 
more is revealed about the intentions of the federal government in implement-
ing the policy, the stronger the likelihood of surviving a challenge to the FTCA 
claim in this case. 
Because Bivens claims thus far have either been dismissed or are still in the 
motions phase,138 these cases hold the most promise for the development of 
government accountability precedent in the family separation context. Because 
most other cases alleging abuse while in government custody in a detained set-
ting on U.S. soil could be classified as either criminal or grossly negligent con-
duct, these cases may also create useful precedent for those cases. At the very 
least, the discovery process in C.M. will hopefully shed additional light on the 
intentions behind the government’s decision to implement the zero-tolerance 
 
130  Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 10–11. 
131  Case Management Order at 2, C.M. v. United States, No. 19-CV-05217, 2020 WL 
1698191 (D. Ariz. June 18, 2020). 
132  Complaint at 1–2, E.L.A. v. United States, No. 20-CV-01524 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 15, 
2020). 
133  Id. at 1–14. 
134  Id. at 10, ¶ 44. 
135  Id. at 18–20. 
136  Id. at 20. 
137  See id. passim. 
138  Havan Clark et al., Bivens Basics: An Introductory Guide for Immigration Attorneys, 
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites 
/default/files/practice_advisory/bivens_basics_an_introductory_guide_for_immigration_attor
neys.pdf [https://perma.cc/QXQ5-TQRR] (discussing the limited scope in which a Bivens 
claim will survive after Supreme Court’s holding in Ziglar v. Abbasi which limited the abil-
ity of a federal court to hear a Bivens claim to previously raised contexts). 
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and family separation polices to begin with, likely revealing that cruelty was, 
indeed, the point. 
D. Forced Un-Accompaniment, Permanent Foster Placements, and 
Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship 
In addition to the children separated from their families, those children who 
arrive unaccompanied by a parent, guardian, or other adult (for whom special 
legal protections exist) are suffering the same conditions in violation of estab-
lished precedent.139 Notably, many children who were separated from their par-
ents at the border were later deemed to be “unaccompanied” by virtue of the 
fact that their parents were now being detained in another facility and/or de-
ported without them.140 To date, the United States government still does not 
have a thorough accounting of how many such children have been impacted. 
Legally, this particular pattern of classification is problematic because the 
term “unaccompanied alien child” is defined in the Immigration and Nationali-
ty Act as, 
[A] child who—(A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States; (B) 
has not attained 18 years of age; and (C) with respect to whom—(i) there is no 
parent or legal guardian in the United States; or (ii) no parent or legal guardian 
in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody.141 
The classification of children as unaccompanied is largely an administrative 
function, particularly for recent arrivals, therefore there is no adjudicative body 
making particular findings with respect to whether parents or legal guardians 
separated from their children at the border and detained separately are “una-
vailable” to provide care and physical custody.142 
As such, families impacted by the wrongful classification of children as 
“unaccompanied” may have additional due process claims available to them. 
Also, they may have suffered unique harms because the Unaccompanied Alien 
Child (UAC) classification may also result in an immigrant child being adopted 
by another family without the knowledge, consent, or even service on the right-
 
139  See infra Section IV.A. 
140  See Amanda Holpuch & Lauren Gambino, Why Are Families Being Separated at the US 
Border?, GUARDIAN (June 18, 2018, 11:26 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/201 
8/jun/18/why-are-families-being-separated-at-the-us-border-explainer [https://perma.cc/7H 
WR-CZ62]. 
141  6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2). 
142  William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. 
L. No. 110-457, sec. 235, 122 Stat. 5044, 5077 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1232) 
(“[T]he care and custody of all unaccompanied alien children, including responsibility for 
their detention, where appropriate, shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of [the De-
partment of] Health and Human Services [and its sub-agency, ORR].”); see Jacinto-Castanon 
de Nolasco v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 319 F. Supp. 3d 491, 495 n.2 (D.D.C. 2018); 
8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1); see also 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (providing the statutory definition of 
unaccompanied child in the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
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ful parent.143 The further and permanent separation of parent and child through 
the family justice system, which has occurred under different factual scenarios 
in the immigration context, could trigger additional parental rights, including 
those protected by the First Amendment right to familial association.144 
At least one court has held that a right to due process exists when children 
are unconstitutionally separated from their mother, even when the government 
asserts that she is “unavailable to provide care and physical custody” to her 
children while lawfully detained.145 In a strongly worded footnote, the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia specifically rejected the gov-
ernment’s disingenuous argument that the children were properly labeled as 
“unaccompanied” when it was the government that separated the children from 
their parents in the first place.146 Because this is a common argument raised in 
the government’s pleadings in these cases, judges have a real opportunity to 
dismantle one of the pillars of legal distortion and fiction that the government 
relies on to justify its cruelty. 
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM AND THE STATE-CREATED DANGER DOCTRINE 
Less than a week after the decision in Ms. L. in favor of parents separated 
from their children, the Yale Law Clinics and Connecticut Legal Services filed 
a similar lawsuit on behalf of the only two children separated from their parents 
at the border who were subsequently relocated to Connecticut.147 In J.S.R. v. 
Sessions, the Petitioners’ primary injunctive claim sought immediate release of 
both children and parents from immigration detention to facilitate family reuni-
fication, or in the alternative, to release the children to a suitable sponsor until 
they could be reunited.148 Like other family separation cases, the complaint as-
serted violations of procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, 
 
143  See Kathryn Joyce, The Threat of International Adoption for Migrant Children Separated 
from Their Families, INTERCEPT (July 1, 2018, 6:37 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/07/0 
1/separated-children-adoption-immigration [https://perma.cc/2YEG-KGQV]. 
144  See generally Sarah Rogerson, Lack of Detained Parents’ Access to the Family Justice 
System and the Unjust Severance of the Parent-Child Relationship, 47 FAM. L.Q. 141 
(2013); Benjamin R. Picker & Johnathan C. Dunsmoor, Social Services and Constitutional 
Rights, a Balancing Act, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 11, 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/grou 
ps/litigation/committees/civil-rights/articles/2013/social-services-and-constitutional-rights-a-
balancing-act [https://perma.cc/2QA9-SW9K] (“The First Amendment also provides a pos-
sible cause of action. Courts have recognized that the First Amendment protects the funda-
mental right to intimate association, which includes the familial association between parents 
and children.”). 
145  Jacinto-Castanon de Nolasco, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 505 (granting plaintiffs’ motion for pre-
liminary injunction to reunite Petitioner with her children on the basis of the right to family 
integrity). 
146  Id. at 495 n.2 (“[Petitioner’s] children, however, are not true unaccompanied minors 
within the meaning of the statute; they were rendered unaccompanied by the unilateral and 
likely unconstitutional actions of defendants.”). 
147  J.S.R. v. Sessions, 330 F. Supp. 3d 731, 733 (D. Conn. 2018). 
148  Id. 
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and other claims.149 But importantly, it advanced a relatively new theory: viola-
tions of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which protects individuals who 
suffer from a disability.150 Arguing that at least one petitioner child had suf-
fered Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of being forcibly 
separated from his parents, the claim rested on the child’s protected status as 
disabled.151 
In alleging irreparable harm, the Petitioners submitted the expert testimony 
regarding the specific psychological harm suffered by them as a result of the 
separation.152 In addition to the harm caused by the separation itself, the com-
plaint revealed that one of the subject children was kept in a cage with other 
young children for four days at the Port Isabel Service Detention Center before 
being transferred.153 Expert testimony submitted in the case concluded that, 
“there likely will be both short-term and long-term physical and mental health 
consequences for the children” including higher risk for “mental health conse-
quences, including higher rates of depression, anxiety, symptoms of PTSD, 
substance abuse disorders” and “a higher risk of physical conditions, such as 
cardio-vascular disease, diabetes, and even cancer.”154 
In his ruling, the Judge reinforced the recognition of the right to family in-
tegrity as well as the legal conclusion in Ms. L. that the separation of parents 
and children at the border was “unconstitutional.”155 However, due to the Peti-
tioners eligibility as class members under the Ms. L. case, the Petitioner’s mo-
tion was denied with regard to the immediate reunification of the children with 
their parents.156 Due to the evidence of harm submitted via expert testimony 
however, the court took the extra step of ordering that the parties confer regard-
ing the appropriate relief to address the children’s PTSD during separation and 
post reunification.157 
 
149  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief & Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 
13–16, J.S.R. v. Sessions, 330 F. Supp. 3d 731 (D. Conn. 2018) (No. 18-CV-01106). 
150  See 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(3) (stating that individuals with disabilities should have increased 
opportunities for employment, enjoyment of life, and inclusion). 
151  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief & Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
supra note 149, at 13–16. 
152  J.S.R., 330 F. Supp. 3d at 733–35. 
153  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief & Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
supra note 149, at 11. The means of separation were abrupt and shocking. One of the subject 
children, who was fourteen years old, left her mother to take a shower at the Texas detention 
facility and when she returned, her mother was gone. The child was then taken to Connecti-
cut while her mother remained detained in Texas. J.S.R., 330 F. Supp. 3d at 735. 
154  J.S.R., 330 F. Supp. 3d at 735. 
155  Id. at 741. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. at 745. The Court declined to order immediate reunification due to the fact that the 
Petitioners qualified as class members and the relief of reunification “should be obtained in 
and through that proceeding.” Id. at 733; see also District Court Orders Parties to Confer 
Regarding Appropriate Relief to Address PTSD in Children Separated from Their Parents at 
the Border, 95 INTERPRETER RELEASES, Art. 5 (July 23, 2018). 
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This is important for a number of reasons. First, the court found the expert 
testimony regarding the psychological harm of family separation to be persua-
sive enough to warrant specific relief.158 Second, the court distinguished the 
specific claim of psychological harm from the issue of family reunification 
(precluded by Ms. L.), which allowed the court to then order the government to 
provide the immediate and specific relief of mental health services.159 Finally, 
the court’s ruling made an explicit connection between the unconstitutional 
federal policies and the harm suffered.160 
Notably, the government released the parents and children from custody 
sua sponte and reunited the families in less than one business day, well beyond 
the specific mental health-related relief ordered.161 Because the case was subse-
quently settled, the court did not reach the substance of the due process claims. 
However, another case filed on behalf of other families impacted by family 
separation in California just ten days after J.S.R. has led to a preliminary ruling 
that has the potential to dramatically alter the landscape of claims by immi-
grants harmed in the custody of immigration authorities.162 
A. State-Created Danger and Families in Detention: J.P. v. Sessions 
In November 2019, Judge John A. Kronstadt of the United States District 
Court, Central District of California, denied the government’s motion to dis-
miss a claim filed on behalf of a class of parents and children separated at the 
border seeking declaratory and injunctive relief “in the form of mental health 
screenings and trauma-informed mental health treatment . . . .”163 The govern-
ment’s motion was based on a defense of sovereign immunity.164 The Petition-
er’s claims are rooted in equal protection and due process constitutional 
claims.165 In denying the government sovereign immunity, Judge Kronstadt in-
voked the historically immunity-preserving doctrine of “state-created danger,” 
opening a sliver of promise for a muted theory in light of the unique facts of 
family separation and detention abuses.166 
The state-created danger theory of recoverability is an exception to sover-
eign immunity that imposes on government, “a constitutional duty to protect a 
 
158  J.S.R., 330 F. Supp. 3d at 743. 
159  Id. at 743–44. 
160  Id. at 744. The government’s main response to the Constitutional claims raised by the 
families was that they were all moot on account of Ms. L. class membership. Id. at 739–40. 
161  See Notice of Compliance at 2, J.S.R., 330 F. Supp. 3d 731 (No. 18-CV-01106). The 
Court ordered on July 13, 2018, that the families be reunited by July 26, 2018, but the gov-
ernment asserted in a Notice of Compliance filed with the Court that the families had been 
reunited on July 16, 2018. Id. at 1–2. 
162  J.P. v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-06081, 2019 WL 6723686 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2019), sub 
nom. J.P. v. Barr, No. 18-CV-06081, 2019 WL 6723686 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2019). 
163  Id. at *1–2. 
164  Id. at *27. 
165  Id. at *1. 
166  Id. at *36. 
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person against injuries inflicted by a third-party when [the government] affirm-
atively places the person in a position of danger the person would not otherwise 
have faced.”167 Referred to colloquially as the “snake pit” theory, states have 
widely varied in its application, leading to much confusion.168 The doctrine’s 
origins are rooted in several cases involving the deaths of children due to gov-
ernment inaction in which the Supreme Court “held that the government has no 
duty to protect people from privately inflicted harms.”169 With few exceptions, 
the government almost always wins and the victims do not recover: 
There is no series of cases that are more consistently depressing than the state-
created danger decisions. The litigation typically arises because of a terrible 
tragedy. A suit is brought against the government and its officials on the grounds 
that if they had intervened they could have stopped or prevented the tragedy. 
Yet, the government almost always prevails.170 
But Judge Kronstadt’s ruling holds the potential to dramatically weaken the 
sovereign immunity defenses that the government is asserting in family separa-
tion cases nationwide, and might possibly have an even larger impact depend-
ing on whether the case proceeds to trial. Constitutional law expert Professor 
Erwin Chemerinsky, who has written definitive scholarship on the issue of 
state-created danger,171 marked the importance of Judge Kronstadt’s opinion 
denying the government’s motion to dismiss: 
This is truly groundbreaking . . . . The court is recognizing that when a govern-
ment creates a danger that inflicts trauma, the government is responsible for 
providing a solution. It is not something I have seen a court do before.172 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the government appealed this order to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which they denied.173 By joint stipulation, the case is 
 
167  Kamara v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 420 F.3d 202, 216 (3d Cir. 2005); see Kneipp v. Tedder, 
95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir. 1996) (outlining the four elements of state-created danger:  
“(1) [T]he harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the state actor acted 
in willful disregard for the safety of the plaintiff; (3) there existed some relationship between 
the state and the plaintiff; and (4) the state actors used their authority to create an opportunity 
that otherwise would not have existed for the third party’s crime to occur.” (quoting Mark v. 
Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1152 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
168  Laura Oren, Safari into the Snake Pit: The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 13 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1165, 1211 (2005) (“Unless, and until, the Supreme Court makes its pro-
nouncement or the other circuits shake down to a remarkable degree of uniformity, each new 
case will face the same barrier: We do not say whether the doctrine exists, and even if it 
does, our not saying makes it not clearly established law.”). 
169  Erwin Chemerinsky, The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 23 TOURO L. R. 1 (2007). No-
tably, one of the two cases establishing this doctrine is the Lenahan case discussed supra 
note 88. The other is DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 
U.S. 189, 201 (1989) (finding that the failures of the government’s child welfare system to 
protect four-year-old Joshua DeShaney from his father’s lethal violence did not violate Josh-
ua’s due process rights). 
170  Chemerinsky, supra note 169. 
171  See generally id. (providing a thorough accounting of the origins and trajectory of the 
state-created danger doctrine). 
172  Jordan, supra note 68 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky). 
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currently stayed, including discovery, until January 2021.174 Unfortunately, on 
June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States denied a request for a 
writ of certiorari in a case that could resolve a growing circuit split on the issue 
of whether qualified immunity applies to the state-created danger theory.175 But 
the Ninth Circuit is in the minority of circuits that places the burden of persua-
sion in qualified immunity cases on the defendant, meaning that there is still 
hope that in this particular case the “state-created-danger” claim could proceed 
to discovery.176 
The government is right to have serious concerns about this case. Although 
the state-created danger doctrine has been limited in its application to cases 
where immigration is at the heart of the claim177 this case is more likely to sur-
vive that precedential exclusion for several reasons. First, it is the government’s 
abuse of authority in implementing zero-tolerance and family separation, rather 
than a failure to act, that gives rise to the claim. Because the government’s stat-
ed goals of the policies were deterrence and punishment and because individu-
als were separated and detained by the governments actions under the policy, 
the claims are factually well-suited to this particular claim.178 Second, the cases 
involving family separation are distinguishable because the link between the 
government as actor and the harm suffered by the immigrant has nothing to do 
with immigration law, and everything to do with both (a) the government’s in-
tentionally and unnecessarily cruel implementation of it; and (b) the conditions 
of detention, which are completely and absolutely within the control of the fed-
eral government.179 Recently, Courts have specifically applied the state-created 
 
173  Notice of Appeal at 1, J.P. v. Barr, No. 18-CV-06081 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2019); Order 
from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, J.P. v. Barr, No. 18-CV-06081 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 
2020) (granting Defendants’ motion for voluntary dismissal of Defendants’ appeal). 
174  Stipulation to Stay Case at 3, J.P. v. Barr, No. 18-CV-6081 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020). 
175  Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 207 L. Ed. 2d 1051 (2020). 
176  Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, Minnesota, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.co 
m/case-files/cases/anderson-v-city-of-minneapolis-minnesota/ [https://perma.cc/MM7N-69S 
V]. 
177  Rranci v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 540 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We have stated une-
quivocally that ‘the state-created danger exception has no place in our immigration jurispru-
dence.’ ”). 
178  The government’s intent in creating, implementing and enforcing zero-tolerance and 
family separation are thoroughly detailed in Cordero et al., supra note 5, passim, and in, 
Stumpf, supra note 8, passim. Also consider Judge Kronstadt’s reasoning that, “ ‘the point of 
the state-created danger doctrine is that the affirmative actions of a state official created or 
exposed an individual to danger which he or she would not have otherwise faced.’ ” J.P. v. 
Sessions, No. 18-CV-06081, 2019 WL 6723686, at *35 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2019) (quoting 
Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2012)), sub nom. J.P. v. Barr, No. 18-
CV-06081, 2019 WL 6723686 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2019). 
179  See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERFORMANCE-BASED 
NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 2011 (rev. 2016), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
standards/2011/pbnds2011r2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT52-WXVE]. 
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danger doctrine to immigrant detainees at risk of contracting COVID-19.180 It 
may very well be that the COVID-19 litigation outpaces the family separation 
cases, the former laying even more groundwork for a favorable recovery in the 
latter. 
IV. CLAIMS REGARDING THE ABUSE AND DEATH OF IMMIGRANTS IN 
DETENTION, INCLUDING PARENTS AND CHILDREN POST-SEPARATION 
Immigration violations are largely civil in nature and immigration deten-
tion has long been considered civil rather than penal.181 However, many legal 
scholars have argued that because immigration enforcement has taken on an 
increasingly penal approach and irregular migration has been criminalized, 
immigration detention serves as punishment, rather than process, and detained 
migrants should be entitled to increased constitutional protections, similar to 
those held by individuals in the criminal justice system.182 Recent attempts to 
use these arguments in litigation attempting to establish a right to counsel for 
detained immigrant children have been unsuccessful.183 However, cases 
brought on behalf of child migrants have fared much better in terms of estab-
lishing certain rights concerning the conditions of their detention. 
Speaking to the strength of these protections, some have recently argued 
that a child-centric view of family separation and detention may provide a 
stronger legal foundation to hold government accountable for harms inflicted in 
detention, including family separation.184 Children comprise a large percentage 
of the potential plaintiffs in these cases. At the height of the 2018 wave of mi-
gration at the southern border, approximately 15,000 children were held in de-
tention centers nationwide.185 The detention population is ever-changing with 
 
180  See, e.g., Castillo v. Barr, 449 F. Supp. 3d 915, 920, 923 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (granting tem-
porary restraining order because “the Government cannot put a civil detainee into a danger-
ous situation, especially where that dangerous situation was created by the Government.”). 
181  See ALINA DAS, NO JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS: HOW AMERICA CRIMINALIZES IMMIGRANTS 
27–58 (2020). See generally KELLY LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRA! A HISTORY OF THE U.S. 
BORDER PATROL (2010). 
182  Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
613, 613–14 (2012) (detailing how immigration enforcement has been criminalized over 
time); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1349 (2014) (linking the overcriminalization of immigration to the in-
creasingly penal nature of immigration detention); CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA 
HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON: AMERICA’S OBSESSION WITH LOCKING UP IMMIGRANTS 
9–11 (2019) (detailing the history of immigration prison and its penal nature). 
183  See J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that the court 
lacked jurisdiction over the question of whether indigent immigrant children have a right to 
government-appointed counsel, not the substantive rights implicated). 
184  See Jonathan Todres & Daniela Villamizar Fink, The Trauma of Trump’s Family Separa-
tion and Child Detention Actions: A Children’s Rights Perspective, 95 WASH. L. REV. 377, 
380 (2020) (arguing that the child’s rights framework carries the “force of law”); see also 
Cordero et al., supra note 5, at 485–91. 
185  See John Burnett, Tent City Housing Migrant Children to Close as Kids Are Released to 
Sponsors, NPR (Jan. 4, 2019, 8:12 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/04/682437566 [https:/ 
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some established facilities remaining, temporary shelters erected and then dis-
mantled under pressure, and contentious debates holding up or pushing forward 
proposals between county officials and the federal government to house detain-
ees.186 With few outliers and to varying degrees, the maltreatment of detainees 
is the common thread.187 While holding families and children in miserable and 
inhumane conditions in violation of existing detention standards, DHS contin-
ues to abuse and neglect children in their custody and several have died, alleg-
edly as a result of the government’s abuse and neglect.188 In September 2019, 
the ACLU reported that thirty-one immigrants had “died in immigration custo-
dy during the Trump administration.”189 
Videos and reports of abuses of detainees by the detention officers and 
staff at these facilities are emerging.190 Documents released through initial pub-
lic records requests reveal verbal, physical, and sexual abuse of children by 
immigration officials.191 Several children have died in DHS custody, including 
 
/perma.cc/FL9H-PJ4Y]. 
186  See Immigration Detention in the United States by Agency, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Jan. 
2, 2020), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigration-detention-unit 
ed-states-agency [https://perma.cc/899S-SNJ5]. 
187  See id. An internal report in the Department of Homeland Security from March 2019, 
details seventeen complaints from detention facilities in Arizona, Texas, New Jersey, Geor-
gia, Louisiana, and Washington, including allegations from lack of psychiatric monitoring 
leading to mental health deterioration to serious medication errors and forcible medication as 
a means of behavior control, to inadequate care leading to death. Memorandum from Cam-
eron P. Quinn, Officer for C.R. & C.L., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Ronald Vitiello, 
Deputy Dir. & Senior Off., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.doc 
umentcloud.org/documents/6575024 [https://perma.cc/A3ZP-WJF2]. 
188  See Executive Summary, in CASHING IN ON CRUELTY, supra note 34, at 2. 
189  Id. at 1. 
190  See, e.g., Angelina Chapin, Drinking Toilet Water, Widespread Abuse: Report Details 
‘Torture’ for Child Detainees, HUFFPOST (July 18, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/m 
igrant-children-detail-experiences-border-patrol-stations-detention-centers_n_5b4d13ffe4b0 
de86f485ade8 [https://perma.cc/JB8H-Z23G]; Blake Ellis et al., Handcuffs, Assaults, and 
Drugs Called ‘Vitamins’: Children Allege Grave Abuse at Migrant Detention Facilities, 
CNN (June 21, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/21/us/undocumented-migrant-children-
detention-facilities-abuse-invs/index.html [https://perma.cc/2L3J-9ZBU]; Matthew Haag, 
Two Workers at Arizona Migrant Children Centers Are Charged With Sexual Abuse, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/03/us/sexual-abuse-arizona-migran 
t-children.html [https://perma.cc/UQ7E-7NWJ]; Patricia Hurtado, Migrant Children De-
scribe Abuse, Hunger in U.S. Detention Facilities, BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2018, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-24/migrant-children-detail-rough-reality 
-as-judge-weighs-monitoring [https://perma.cc/R9CZ-FFG6]; Mary Jo Pitzl, Videos: Mi-




191  See sources cited supra note 190; see also Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., Dist. of Ariz., 
Youth Care Worker Convicted of Sexually Abusing Unaccompanied Minors in Southwest 
Key Facility (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-az/pr/youth-care-worker-convict 
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one child who died in 2018 on Christmas Day and another who died as a result 
of complications from the flu in December 2019.192 This led the Chairman of 
the House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee, Bennie Thomp-
son, to call former DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen before Congress to demand 
answers to critical questions around the family separation crisis and the treat-
ment of children in DHS custody—in both publicly and privately run facili-
ties.193 
Meanwhile, the Trump administration has denied any responsibility for the 
deaths of children in their custody, deflecting attention instead to the danger of 
unlawful migration and blaming the parents who migrated with their chil-
dren.194 Beyond deflection, the government appears to have deprioritized any 
reports of such deaths to DHS leadership.195 During a Congressional hearing in 
early December 2018, nearly a year into the implementation of the family sepa-
ration policy, Secretary Nielsen stated that she did not know the numbers of 
children who had died in DHS custody.196 Although the Trump administration 
has claimed to scale back these policies, the government’s position has not sub-
stantially changed: children and their parents assume the risk of death, even 
when lawfully presenting themselves at the border to claim asylum, and the 
government disclaims liability because the ends justify the means “to secure the 
border.”197 This position has drawn support from an anti-immigrant political 




192  See supra note 6. 
193  See Letter from Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives 
Comm. on Homeland Sec., to Kirstjen Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Jan. 4, 
2019), https://homeland.house.gov/imo/media/doc/nielsen19.pdf [https://perma.cc/FA86-
39QU]. 
194  See Caitlin Oprysko & Ted Hesson, Trump Administration Rejects Responsibility for 
Death of 7-Year-Old Girl in Border Patrol Custody, POLITICO (Dec. 14, 2018, 3:22 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/14/nielsen-migrant-girl-death-border-patrol-
1063729 [https://perma.cc/7QY2-BCJ5]. 
195  See Cheyenne Haslett, Pressed by Democrats, Homeland Security Chief Can’t Give 
Number of Migrant Deaths in Government Custody, ABC NEWS (Dec. 21, 2018, 4:42 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/pressed-democrats-nielsen-give-number-migrant-deaths-
government/story?id=59906664 [https://perma.cc/66XE-NACT] (“Homeland Security Sec-
retary Kirstjen Nielsen said Thursday she could not provide a specific number of how many 
other people might have died in U.S. government custody.”). 
196  See Homeland Security Department Oversight (C-SPAN television broadcast Dec. 20, 
2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?456086-1 [https://perma.cc/AT8X-WZTH]. 
197  See supra note 195; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1); Donald J. Trump, President, U.S., 
Address to the Nation on the Crisis at the Border (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.go 
v/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-address-nation-crisis-border [https://perma. 
cc/4LNP-QALE]; Press Release, Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
Statement on Passing of Eight Year Old Guatemalan Child (Dec. 26, 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/12/26/secretary-kirstjen-m-nielsen-statement-passing-eight-
year-old-guatemalan-child [https://perma.cc/9SS8-B6CC]; Press Release, U.S. Customs & 
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A. Flores Revisited: Forced Medication and Blocked Access to Counsel 
Several organizations have filed legal challenges to many aspects of the 
manner and conditions under which DHS is detaining children, in particular.200 
As the government shut down over Trump’s demand for a border wall dragged 
on, a D.C. federal court judge cited the “safety of human life” as the reason to 
continue a challenge to holding teenage migrants in adult facilities in spite of a 
“lapse in federal funding during the government shutdown.”201 This particular 
line of litigation rests on well-settled precedent that took decades to build and 
may well be litigated for decades to come: the Flores settlement and its proge-
ny.202 This line of cases set minimum standards for the detention of children,203 
including conditions and length of detention.204 
 
Border Prot., Statement on Death in Custody: 7-Year-Old Guatemalan in El Paso, TX (Dec. 
14, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/speeches-and-statements/cbp-statement-death-cu 
stody-7-year-old-guatemalan-el-paso-tx [https://perma.cc/EKL8-4J4Q]; Jeff Sessions, Att’y 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks Discussing the Immigration Enforcement Actions of the 
Trump Administration (May 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-
sessions-delivers-remarks-discussing-immigration-enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/6K 
SQ-M3CC]. 
198  See, e.g., Luis Sanchez, Poll: Majority of Republicans Back Family Separation Policy, 
HILL (June 18, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/392802-poll-
majority-of-republicans-back-family-separation-policy [https://perma.cc/A5XR-6B8R]; Vot-
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21 NEV. L.J. 583 
618 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:2  
The latest round of litigation to hold the government accountable for a lack 
of compliance under the agreement involves three main claims: (1) that the 
government administered psychotropic drugs to children separated from their 
parents without first obtaining their parents’ consent; (2) that separated children 
were held in overly restrictive environments, their detention prolonged due to 
the government claiming that their detained parents were unfit without due pro-
cess of law; and (3) that the government blocked access to the children’s law-
yers who were attempting to address the conditions of their confinement, all in 
violation of the Flores consent decree.205 These claims both complement and 
supplement other the other family separation cases because they are specifically 
grounded in precedent. 
Because of this grounding, the government’s attempt to undermine the 
claims and the consent decree itself have failed thus far. What remains to be 
seen is whether and how the protections of the Flores consent decree will be 
strengthened in the wake of the government’s actions in implementing the fam-
ily separation policy, particularly with regard to the types of relief that detained 
children can obtain. Further, some of the fact-finding and precedent set in this 
new round of cases may provide additional support for other cases involving 
the conditions of detention that fall outside of Flores’s protection. Notably, the 
Flores litigation recently resulted in a victory for claims seeking injunctive re-
lief citing the deterioration of conditions in detention due to the COVID-19 
pandemic and the government’s failure to adequately protect detainees.206 It 
bears repeating that the pandemic litigation may be quietly improving the 
chances of securing remedies for both family separation and non-COVID relat-
ed detention abuses. 
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Lucas R. v. Azar, No. 18-CV-05741, 2018 WL 10483438 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 7, 2018), 2018 WL 
8803996, at *2 (alleging that ORR violated the Flores agreement by confining children in 
overly restrictive environments, prolonging their detention on the grounds that their parents 
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B. Victory in the Tucson Sector 
On February 19, 2020, a landmark ruling in Arizona enjoined the federal 
government from holding detainees for longer than 48 hours, unless  
CBP can provide conditions of confinement that meet detainees’ basic human 
needs for sleeping in a bed with a blanket, a shower, food that meets acceptable 
dietary standards, potable water, and medical assessment performed by a medi-
cal professional.207 
The case, filed in June 2015, challenged the detention conditions at several 
facilities collectively located in what’s known as the “Tucson Sector.”208 The 
claims centered on the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory 
Judgement Act.209 Widely celebrated as a major victory in advocating for more 
favorable detention conditions, the case explicitly characterizes immigration 
detention in the Tucson Sector as “punitive” even while maintaining that immi-
gration detention is civil in nature.210 Although this case may ultimately result 
in the functional equivalent of a Flores-like judicially monitored consent de-
cree, as the litigation continues (an appeal of the decision to the Ninth Circuit is 
pending),211 it may articulate the specific conditions for basic needs to be met in 
immigration detention, to which the government may be held accountable in 
other facilities. Additionally, this opinion formally recognizes the punitive na-
ture of immigration detention, which may result in future enhanced Constitu-
tional protections for immigrants seeking to challenge their treatment in these 
facilities.  
C. Sexual Assault of Immigrant Detainees 
Cases involving the sexual assault of detainees in immigration custody, in-
cluding children, have risen dramatically.212 “The Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment provides immigration detainees with the right to be free from 
physical attack, including sexual assault.”213 A recent case with precedent-
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213  E.D. v. Sharkey, No. 16-2750, 2017 WL 2126322, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 2017) (Plain-
tiff alleged sexual assault by a staff member in the Berks Immigration Detention Facility in 
Pennsylvania); see Adekoya v. Chertoff, 431 F. App’x. 85, 88 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curium) 
(holding that immigration detainees are entitled to the same constitutional protections as pre-
trial detainees). 
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setting potential involves a female detainee alleging that she was sexually as-
saulted in custody by a staff member in an immigration detention facility in 
Berks, Pennsylvania.214 The Petitioner brought several claims against individual 
employees of the county government running the facility and various federal 
immigration officials who also worked at the facility.215 Her claims included 
relief for the assault itself, failure of employees to protect her against the sexual 
assault, failure of supervisors to implement and establish adequate policies 
against sexual assault in the facility, and a retaliation claim against an employ-
ee who she claimed denied Plaintiff’s parole as a result of her reporting the as-
sault.216 
Unfortunately, the statutory civil rights claims of failure to protect, failure 
to implement policies, and retaliation claims against some of the defendants did 
not survive a defense of qualified immunity, largely because the Third Circuit 
determined that they were insufficiently plead.217 However, a number of the 
Bivens claims against (ironically) six government officials, including the abu-
sive agent and his supervisors, survived summary judgement.218 In remanding 
the case for trial, the Circuit Court denied an interlocutory appeal by the de-
fendants, agreeing with the District Court that: 
[T]here is enough evidence to support an inference that the Defendants knew of 
the risk facing E.D., and that their failure to take additional steps to protect her – 
acting in their capacity as either a co-worker or supervisor – ‘could be viewed 
by a factfinder as the sort of deliberate indifference’ to a detainee’s safety that 
the Constitution forbids.219 
With this ruling, the Third Circuit and the District Court chip away at the 
effectiveness of the qualified immunity defense, particularly regarding both the 
perpetrators of sexual assault and their enablers in an immigration detention 
setting. In January 2020, the case was ultimately settled, however the precedent 
remains: detainees have a clearly established right “not to be sexually assaulted 
by a state employee while in confinement . . . .”220 Citing Sharkey precedent, at 
least one other court has allowed for claims to proceed against an officer who 
assaulted a United States citizen detained pre-trial, as well as failure to protect 
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claims to proceed against some of the other officers in question, stating defini-
tively that, “Sexual assault constitutes impermissible punishment, as it cannot 
and does not serve a legitimate governmental objective.”221 It follows then, that 
cases alleging sexual assault against children and adults in immigration deten-
tion have a much better chance at surviving government immunity defenses 
than other classes of claims. 
D. Additional Claims to Consider 
The theories developing in courts now may lay critical foundations to chal-
lenge other abuses suffered by immigrants in detention, some who have been 
impacted by the family separation policy and some who have not. For example, 
documented abuses against transgender women are on the rise.222 Pregnant 
mothers are also experiencing severe abuses, maltreatment, and lack of medical 
care while in the custody of immigration authorities.223 An alarming number of 
immigrant detainees, including those who are disabled or who identify as 
LGBTQ are being held in solitary confinement, which is a form of punishment 
that has been established as particularly cruel.224 As these reports and others 
surface, the application of the theories being developed in these groundbreak-
ing cases and the relief afforded by the court system, even if incremental, may 
ultimately lead to a cascade of recovery for unauthorized immigrants victim-
ized by cruel immigration detention policies. 
CONCLUSION 
It is hard to imagine that the justice system will ever be able to fully and ef-
fectively compensate families and individuals suffering under federal immigra-
tion policies specifically designed to inflict pain and suffering, particularly at 
this early stage of the litigation. However, early indicators show that the 
uniquely cruel nature of the family separation policy and the increasingly puni-
tive nature of immigration detention, paired with the government’s gross negli-
gence in handling both may provide openings to pierce immunity or avoid it 
altogether by bringing claims under statutes specifically designed to afford 
some measure of relief to the victims. Each case builds on the other in an itera-
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tive process with the hope of more permanently and meaningfully expanding 
the landscape of meaningful recovery for unauthorized immigrant victims 
against an abusive government. 
* * * 
